As Vietnam prepares for its March 2026 elections, state media is filled with promises of “digital innovation” and “better leadership.” For the Indigenous Khmer-Krom people, however, these slogans cannot hide a basic reality: an election cannot be free or meaningful when the system is built to control political choice and to weaken the religious and cultural institutions that hold our community together.
Vietnam’s electoral model is often summarized in one phrase: “Đảng cử dân bầu”—the Party appoints, the people elect. Under this model, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) determines who may run, and only those approved candidates appear on the ballot. The public is allowed to vote, but not to choose from a genuinely open field. This is not a competitive representation; it is a managed outcome.
From an international law perspective, this raises serious concerns under Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Vietnam ratified. Article 25 requires that citizens have the right to take part in public affairs and to vote and be elected in genuine periodic elections. When one party controls candidate selection, elections become a confirmation process, not a real opportunity for citizens, including Indigenous communities, to freely shape their political future.
For Khmer-Krom, the harm is not only political. It is cultural and spiritual.
One of the most disturbing developments reported in this election cycle is the inclusion of Khmer-Krom Theravada Buddhist monks as candidates for state positions. For Khmer-Krom, Theravada Buddhism is not simply a private belief. It is the heart of our Indigenous identity. Our pagodas preserve language, values, education, and community leadership. Khmer-Krom Buddhist monks are respected not because they hold worldly authority, but because they dedicate their lives to spiritual discipline and service.
The monastic code (Vinaya) traditionally prohibits monks from engaging in partisan politics or competing for state power. When the state places monks on a ballot, it creates pressure that can distort religious life and confuse the role of spiritual leadership in our society. Even if a monk appears to “agree,” the broader message is clear: religious institutions are not independent; they are to be absorbed into state structures.
This tactic creates two damaging outcomes.
First, it undermines religious freedom. Khmer-Krom Buddhists should not be placed in a situation where sacred vows and community trust are pulled into political campaigns. International standards, including the principles of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), affirm that Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct institutions, including religious and cultural institutions. Turning monks into instruments of political representation weakens that autonomy.
Second, it weakens the monkhood itself. In Khmer-Krom society, monks are often among the last defenders of culture and dignity when other forms of expression are restricted. When spiritual leaders are pushed into state politics, their moral authority can be damaged, community trust can be divided, and the pagoda’s role as a safe cultural center can be reduced to another arm of control. This is not inclusion. It is co-option.
The Vietnamese government often points to “ethnic minority” candidates as proof of inclusiveness. But Khmer-Krom are not merely an “ethnic minority” group in a social sense. We are an Indigenous Peoples with a historical connection to our ancestral land in the Mekong Delta and a distinct cultural and religious system that predates the modern state borders that now surround us. Under international norms, Indigenous peoples are entitled to rights that go beyond token representation, rights to meaningful participation, to self-identification and self-determination, and to the protection of the institutions that sustain their identity.
Representation is not real when it is filtered through Party approval, and it is not legitimate when it relies on individuals pressured to follow state narratives. A ballot that displays “diverse faces” while excluding independent voices offers only a veneer of participation.
Vietnam’s promotion of digital tools and streamlined procedures also does not solve this problem. Technology can speed up voting, but it cannot make an election democratic if the political field is closed. Digital identification systems and modern voting administration do not address the central issue: whether citizens can freely choose leaders, freely run as candidates, and freely organize independent civic and religious life without fear or punishment.
If Vietnam truly seeks legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the international community, it should begin with reforms that respect basic political rights and the dignity of Indigenous communities. At a minimum, that would require:
Until these conditions exist, the March 2026 election will remain less a celebration of public choice and more a demonstration of Party control, wrapped in the language of progress, but experienced by Khmer-Krom as yet another system that demands conformity at the cost of identity.